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Federal Court Adjudication of State Prisoner Claims for 




Undoubtedly, there are innocent people in prison.  Moreover, it is 
probable that the wrongly convicted, if given a chance to conduct DNA 
testing on evidence used against them at trial, could establish their inno-
cence. 
Many federal courts recently have denied prisoners’ requests for post-
conviction DNA testing because the courts have reasoned that the prisoners 
are seeking release from confinement.  This ignores the fact that prisoners 
who seek to prove their innocence through DNA testing necessarily must 
embark upon a two-step process, which courts should bifurcate and con-
sider separately.  The first step, which I call the “procurement phase,” oc-
curs when the initial request is made by a prisoner to secure any biological 
evidence within the state’s control.  If the prisoner’s request is denied, a 
claim is filed against the state prosecutor or sheriff for violating the pris-
oner’s due process right to the evidence, and thus it is properly brought 
under § 1983.1 During this phase, the prisoner is not seeking release from 
confinement; rather, he merely is seeking injunctive relief to obtain and 
conduct DNA testing on evidence that is within the state’s control.    
The second step, or the “exoneration phase,” occurs after the results of 
the DNA testing exclude the prisoner’s DNA from the crime scene.  Dur-
ing this phase, the prisoner seeks to use the test results to demonstrate his 
actual innocence and be released from confinement.  While there is some 
  
 * J.D. candidate, UCLA School of Law, 2004; B.A., Oberlin College, 2000.  Special thanks to 
Professor Gary Rowe for his guidance in the development of this article.  I also am indebted to Jeremy 
Fogel and Thomas Rowe for their invaluable feedback and assistance in editing.  Thanks also to 
Eugene Volokh for taking the time to provide insight into the publication process.  Finally, I would like 
to thank the staff of the Pierce Law Review for their hard work and time spent on this article. 
1.  Typically, prisoners will initially seek access to the evidence by asking the prosecutor who tried 
the case.  If the prosecutor refuses to supply the evidence, the prisoner will file a § 1983 action and 
allege that the prosecutor, acting under color of state law, deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment 
right to Due Process.  See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2002), pet. for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc denied, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002); Boyle v. Mayer, 2002 WL 31085186 (6th Cir. 
Sept. 17, 2002) at *1.  For a discussion as to why a prisoner properly claims a due process violation, 
see infra Part III-C. 
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debate as to the proper federal remedy for claims of actual innocence,2 
requests made during the exoneration phase are properly brought as habeas 
petitions.3 
The Fourth,4 Fifth,5 Sixth,6 and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals7 
have all recently reviewed district court adjudications of prisoners’ § 1983 
actions to obtain DNA testing.  In each case, the prisoner was in the pro-
curement phase and was not seeking release from prison.  The Eleventh 
Circuit stood alone in granting the prisoner’s request; the others, citing the 
Supreme Court decisions Heck v. Humphrey8 and Preiser v. Rodriguez,9 
denied relief because they reasoned that the prisoners, in reality, were at-
tempting to assert claims of actual innocence, which are properly brought 
as habeas petitions.10 
Legislation currently is pending in both the Senate11 and the House of 
Representatives12 that creates a uniform procedure for adjudicating claims 
for post-conviction DNA testing.  The legislation is unclear, however, 
about whether state prisoners may continue to file § 1983 actions directly 
in federal court to obtain such testing.  This ambiguity, unless revised be-
fore enacted, will lead to inconsistent judicial interpretation and further 
confuse the already unpredictable handling of requests for genetic testing. 
Part II of this Comment will examine the reasoning behind recent cir-
cuit court decisions concerning prisoners’ rights to post-conviction genetic 
testing.  I will explain that a bifurcated approach is the appropriate para-
digm for reviewing these claims and demonstrate why three of the four 
circuit courts erred in their analyses.  This part also will review the Su-
preme Court decisions cited by the circuit courts and explain why the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits’ reliance on those decisions was mis-
placed.   
  
 2. See infra Part III(2)(A). 
 3. A writ of habeas is the traditional manner by which a prisoner is able to have his conviction 
dismissed.  See Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830) (explaining that the purpose of a writ of 
habeas corpus is the “liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause” and to 
“examine the legality of the commitment”).  For a history of habeas corpus in the United States, see 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 785-89 (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1994). 
 4. Harvey, 278 F.3d 370. 
 5. Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 6. Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186. 
 7. Bradley v. Pyror, 305 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 8. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
 9. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
 10. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375-78 (relying on Heck and Preiser to reject plaintiff’s claim); 
Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340-41 (same); Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186 at *1 (same). 
 11. Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 S. 1700, 108th Cong. (Oct. 1, 
2003) (as introduced). 
 12. Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (Nov. 
6, 2003) (received by Senate). 
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Part III will address how the Supreme Court should reconcile the cur-
rent circuit split concerning the rights of prisoners to post-conviction DNA 
testing.  This part confronts skeptics’ concerns of protecting finality, re-
specting federalism, and flooding the courts with prisoner suits. It con-
cludes that neither the abstention doctrines nor the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act preclude federal court review of these claims and that a due proc-
ess right to genetic testing should be recognized.  Lastly, I will explain that 
the sole remedy currently available for prisoners with favorable DNA test 
results is executive clemency and I will argue why clemency is an insuffi-
cient solution.   
Finally, Part IV will analyze briefly the pending congressional legisla-
tion and explain that its language, as written, leaves doubt as to whether 
Congress intends to preclude § 1983 actions to prisoners seeking DNA 
testing.  This ambiguity, unless corrected, will further exacerbate federal 
courts’ confusion regarding the proper analysis of such claims. 
II.  RECENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS 
A. Squeezing a Square Peg into a Round Hole:  The Problem with Relying 
on Precedent to Analyze Requests for Genetic Testing 
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals all recently 
have erred in their analysis of § 1983 claims brought by prisoners seeking 
to obtain DNA testing.  In each case, the prisoner’s action was in the pro-
curement phase.  The courts, however, concerned with disrupting the final-
ity of convictions and opening the floodgates to state prisoners, errone-
ously relied on Heck v. Humphrey and Preiser v. Rodriguez, and ultimately 
denied the prisoners’ claims as if they were in the exoneration phase. This 
mistaken reliance was a result of the courts’ utilization of a singular, rather 
than a bifurcated, analysis.   
Heck v. Humphrey was a § 1983 action seeking damages from two 
prosecutors and an investigator for alleged misconduct during the investi-
gation and trial that led to the plaintiff’s confinement.13  The Supreme 
Court dismissed the claim, holding that: 
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the district 
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
  
 13. Heck’s complaint alleged that “respondents, acting under color of state law, had engaged in an 
‘unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation’ leading to [his] arrest; ‘knowingly destroyed’ 
evidence ‘which was exculpatory in nature and could have proved [his] innocence’; and caused ‘an 
illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure’ to be used at [his] trial.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. 
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would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sen-
tence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed . . . .  But if the 
district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if success-
ful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal 
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to pro-
ceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.14 
 
The “whole point” of Heck was to protect the finality of state convic-
tions.15   
In Harvey v. Horan, the Fourth Circuit, concerned that providing post-
conviction genetic testing would offend Heck by disrupting the finality of 
convictions, relied on Heck to deny the plaintiff’s request for DNA test-
ing.16  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, although the petitioner in Heck 
sought damages, “the [Supreme] Court did not limit its holding to such 
claims[] [a]nd we see no reason why its rationale would not apply in a 
situation where a criminal defendant seeks injunctive relief that necessarily 
implies the invalidity of his conviction.”17  Simply stated, the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s holding reflects its belief that “finality cannot be sacrificed to every 
change in technology.”18  The Fifth and Sixth Circuit courts, in terse deci-
sions devoid of explicit reasoning, followed the lead of the Fourth Circuit 
and similarly cited Heck to dismiss claims for post-conviction DNA test-
ing.19 
In addition to concerns about disrupting finality, these courts were 
concerned that recognizing the prisoners’ claims under § 1983 would of-
fend federalism and federal-state comity.  To avoid this problem, the courts 
relied on Preiser and held that the prisoners’ proper remedy is a habeas 
petition.  In Preiser, the Supreme Court denied the respondents’ § 1983 
claim for injunctive relief to re-obtain good-time credits that were forfeited 
because of disciplinary action.20  The Court held that “when a state pris-
oner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, 
and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate 
release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal rem-
  
 14. Id. at 487 (first and second emphasis added, final emphasis in original). 
 15. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375 n.1. 
 16. Id. at 375.  Although Harvey was denied relief in the federal courts, the state courts and legisla-
tures eventually granted his request.  Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 304 (2002) (denying rehearing en 
banc). 
 17. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375. 
 18. Id. at 376. 
 19. Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340-41 (“We agree with the analysis of the Fourth Circuit, which recently 
held, under Heck, that no § 1983 claim exists for injunctive relief to compel DNA testing under materi-
ally indistinguishable circumstances.”); Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186 at *1.  
 20. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. 
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edy is a writ of habeas corpus.”21  The Court reasoned that due to states’ 
strong interest in the administration of their prisons, in order to protect 
federal-state comity, a prisoner challenging his confinement first should be 
required to exhaust available state remedies.22 
The circuit courts, equally concerned with protecting federal-state 
comity, all reasoned that Preiser controlled in the prisoners’ § 1983 actions 
for genetic testing and held that the proper remedy is a habeas petition.  
The Fourth Circuit justified its conclusion by explaining that the plaintiff 
essentially was attempting to gain access to the evidence in order to “set 
the stage for a future attack on his confinement.”23  The Fifth Circuit, 
reaching the same conclusion, reasoned that a prisoner’s request for DNA 
testing is “so intertwined” with the merits of his conviction that any such 
claim must be treated as a habeas petition.24  The Sixth Circuit followed 
the lead of its sister courts and found that the plaintiff was challenging “the 
validity of his criminal convictions and the fact or duration of his contin-
ued confinement”25 and thus his exclusive federal remedy was a writ of 
habeas corpus.26 
In addition to offending federalism, the circuit courts expressed an-
other, equally  troubling, concern with allowing the plaintiffs’ claims to 
proceed under § 1983 - doing so would open the floodgates to state prison-
ers seeking federal court review of their convictions.27  Without the re-
straints of a habeas petition, the argument goes, state prisoners will pro-
ceed directly into federal court to seek release from prison before even 
attempting to exhaust state remedies.  This is a slippery slope that eventu-
ally will overburden federal courts with frivolous claims filed by prisoners 
who will use requests for genetic testing as yet another weapon in their 
arsenal of challenges to their convictions. 
While the concerns expressed by these courts must be taken seriously, 
the error in the courts’ decisions is clear.  Heck is not applicable in the pro-
curement phase because granting a prisoner the right to conduct DNA test-
ing on evidence does not “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his sen-
tence.28  On the contrary, if the prisoner’s suit is successful, the only possi-
ble outcome is that he would obtain access to evidence in order to conduct 
genetic testing.  Although the test results may be favorable to the prisoner 
  
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 491-92. 
 23. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 378. 
 24. See Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 341 (citing Martinez v. Tex. Ct. Crim. App., 292 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 
2002)). 
 25. Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186 at *1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 378. 
 28. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 308 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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and enable him to challenge his conviction in the exoneration phase, 
merely obtaining access to the evidence does not in any way imply the 
invalidity of his sentence.   
Similarly, Preiser is inapposite because the relief sought by a prisoner 
in the procurement phase is an injunction to compel a state official to turn 
over evidence, not a determination that he is entitled to an immediate or 
speedier release from confinement. Since a ruling in the prisoner’s favor 
would not affect the length of his sentence, Preiser is not controlling in the 
procurement phase and should not be relied upon to deny prisoners’ claims 
for access to the evidence.  
Moreover, the policies advanced by Heck and Preiser - protecting fi-
nality and respecting federalism - are more appropriately addressed in the 
exoneration phase, where prisoners actually are seeking release from 
prison based on DNA test results.  In the procurement phase, however, the 
sole concern should be limiting those who qualify to bring claims for ge-
netic testing in order to avoid a flood of claims brought by every prisoner 
who will use such testing as a last-ditch effort to prove his innocence.  
Therefore, while the concerns expressed by these circuit courts are cer-
tainly relevant to the question of whether prisoners ultimately should be 
released based on genetic testing, the error in the courts’ reasoning is a 
consequence of a singular - as opposed to bifurcated - approach to the 
analysis.   
B. Creating a Circuit Split:  The Eleventh Circuit’s Analysis 
Contrary to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit Court decisions, which 
erroneously applied Heck and Preiser to preclude § 1983 claims made dur-
ing the procurement phase, the Eleventh Circuit correctly permitted the 
petitioner’s § 1983 action to stand in Bradley v. Pryor.  In that case, Joe 
Bradley filed a § 1983 action and sought the production of evidence used 
against him at trial29 in order to conduct DNA testing.30   
The Eleventh Circuit, which correctly adopted a bifurcated analysis, 
granted Bradley’s claim.  Specifically, the court distinguished Heck and 
Preiser and reasoned that Bradley will have prevailed in his §1983 action 
once he obtains access to the evidence or an accounting for its absence.31  
The court further reasoned that granting Bradley’s claim does not “neces-
sarily demonstrate[ ] or even impl[y] that his conviction is invalid.”32  The 
  
 29. Specifically, Bradley sought to conduct DNA testing on the rape kit and on the clothing worn by 
the victim when her body was discovered.  Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1288-89. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1290. 
 32. Id. 
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court correctly realized that even if Bradley is able to demonstrate on the 
basis of genetic testing that there is no match between his DNA and the 
evidence used against him, he still would have to bring an entirely different 
lawsuit to challenge his conviction and sentence based on those test re-
sults.33 
Although the court distinguished prisoners’ claims for genetic testing 
from the textual holdings of Heck and Preiser, it neither specifically ad-
dressed the policies advanced by those cases nor explained what should 
happen if the DNA results are favorable to the plaintiff.  Moreover, the 
court neglected to address whether Bradley’s claim for DNA testing differs 
from other prisoner’s claims, or what, if any, consequences will arise from 
granting Bradley’s request.  The following section of this comment con-
fronts these issues and suggests an appropriate paradigm for subsequent 
adjudication of suits for post-conviction genetic testing.   
III. TIME TO ADAPT:  HOW COURTS SHOULD HANDLE CLAIMS IN THE 
FUTURE, ABSENT CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
 
Legislation currently is pending in both the Senate34 and the House of 
Representatives35 to establish uniform guidelines for post-conviction DNA 
testing in state and federal courts.  In the absence of such legislation, how-
ever, the Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split by adopting 
an analysis that recognizes prisoners’ due process right to DNA testing.36  
This bifurcated approach would acknowledge that a prisoner in the pro-
curement phase is constitutionally entitled to conduct genetic testing on the 
evidence, but would nevertheless place the burden on the prisoner to make 
a persuasive showing of actual innocence in the exoneration phase.  
The interests of protecting finality, respecting federalism, and avoiding 
a flood of prisoner litigation are interests that underlie the decisions grap-
pling with post-conviction genetic testing and these concerns must be con-
sidered before any viable solution can be presented.   Numerous law re-
view articles,37 state statutes,38 and even proposed federal legislative bills39 
  
 33. See id. 
 34. 2003 S. 1700, 108th Cong. (Oct. 1, 2003). 
 35. 2003 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (Nov. 6, 2003). 
 36. But see Harvey, 285 F.3d at 303 (suggesting that courts should not “constitutionalize this area;” 
rather, they should wait for Congress to enact appropriate legislation). 
 37. See e.g. Jennifer Boemer, Student Author, Other Rising Legal Issues:  In the Interest of Justice: 
Granting Post-Conviction Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
1971 (2001); Karen Christian, Student Author, “And the DNA Shall Set You Free”: Issues Surrounding 
Postconviction DNA Evidence and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1195 (2001); David 
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have attempted to address the question of whether prisoners should be enti-
tled to post-conviction testing and, if so, whether they should be released if 
the results are favorable to the prisoner.  Each of these efforts, however, 
envisions a singular approach to the analysis, and the vast majority of them 
attempt to solve the problem by imposing various requirements intended to 
limit actions at the procurement phase.  In contrast, a bifurcated approach 
allows the concerns of protecting finality, respecting federalism, and 
avoiding a flood of litigation to be addressed in turn - the latter is the only 
concern relevant in the procurement phase; protecting finality and respect-
ing federalism, on the other hand, are apposite in the exoneration phase. 
A. The Procurement Phase 
As explained in Part II, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Preiser and 
Heck are inapposite to a request to obtain and conduct genetic testing on 
evidence because both of those cases involved prisoners who were trying 
to challenge or shorten the length of their confinement - goals that are not 
applicable in the procurement phase.  The relevant concern in this phase is 
that prisoners seeking post-conviction DNA testing will flood the courts.  
Traditional doctrines created to avoid federal-court adjudication of claims, 
such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act and federal court abstention, were 
not intended to apply to prisoners seeking DNA testing and thus should not 
be applied in these cases.  Instead, courts should recognize prisoners’ due 
process right to such testing and should make DNA evidence available to 
every prisoner whose conviction would be undermined by exculpatory 
results.     
  
DeFoore, Student Author, Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for Justice From the Wrongly Con-
victed, 33 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 491 (2002); Holly Schaffter, Student Author, Postconviction DNA Evi-
dence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50 Drake L. Rev. 695 (2002); Kathy Swedlow, Don’t 
Believe Everything you Read: A Review of Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 Cal. 
W. L. Rev. 355 (2002) .  
 38. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4240 (West 2002); Cal. Penal Code § 1405 (West 2002); Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504 (2002); D.C. Code § 22-4133 (2003) and § 22-4135 (2003); Fla. Stat. § 
925.11 (2002); Idaho Code § 19-4902 (2002); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3 (2002); La. Crim. Proc. 
Code Ann. art. 926.1 (2002); 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2138 (2002); Md. Crim Proc. Code Ann., § 8-
201 (2002); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 547.035 (West 2002); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4120 (2002); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:84A-32a (2002); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 (McKinney 2002); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
269 (2002); Or. Rev. Stat. § 138 (2002); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1 (2002); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 
40-30-303 (2003); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 64.03 (2002); Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-301 (2002); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.73.170 (West 2003); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 974.07 (West 2002).  For a criti-
cism of these legislative attempts, see Swedlow, supra n. 37. 
 39. Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 S. 1700, 108th Cong. (Oct. 1, 
2003); Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (Nov. 
6, 2003). 
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1. The PLRA Does Not Apply to Claims in the Procurement Phase 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a claim to be brought against any person who, 
under color of state law, has violated a federally protected right.40  Unlike 
habeas corpus proceedings, there is no general requirement that a § 1983 
claimant first exhaust available state remedies before filing suit in federal 
court.41  In reaction to the large number of frivolous claims brought by 
prisoners,42 however, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA),43 which establishes an exhaustion requirement specifically for 
prisoners seeking relief in federal court.44  Applying the PLRA to prisoners 
in the procurement phase is one way to limit the influx of claims for post-
conviction genetic testing; however, the PLRA, as written and interpreted 
by the Supreme Court, is not applicable to these suits. 
The PLRA precludes claims by prisoners “with respect to prison con-
ditions” brought under § 1983 or any other federal law “until such adminis-
trative remedies as are available are exhausted.”45  Although the PLRA 
does not define what is meant by “prison conditions,” the Supreme Court 
recently had occasion to interpret the term in Porter v. Nussle.46  In that 
case, Ronald Nussle alleged that a prison officer severely assaulted him in 
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual 
punishments.47  Nussle brought his § 1983 claim directly to federal court, 
bypassing the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.48  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that Nussle’s claim was not controlled by the PLRA 
because the exhaustion requirement “governs only conditions affecting 
prisoners generally, not single incidents, such as corrections officers’ use 
of excessive force, actions that immediately affect only particular prison-
  
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides federal court jurisdiction to hear claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 422. 
 41. Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 437; Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002); Patsy v. Bd. of 
Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). 
 42. Senator Dole, in a statement to Congress, proclaimed that the PLRA was necessary because, 
“[f]rivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable judicial and legal resources, 
and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by the law-abiding citizens.”  141 Cong. Rec. S14413 (daily 
ed. Sept. 25, 1995).  The notion that frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners poses a problem to federal 
courts has been challenged.  See Anne H. Matthews, Student Author, The Inapplicability of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 536, 549-51 (2002).   
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000). 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 534 U.S. 516 (2002). 
 47. Id. at 519. 
 48. Id. at 519-20. 
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ers.”49  The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning and 
held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applied in Nussle’s case.50 
After considering congressional intent and prior judicial precedent, the 
Court ultimately held that “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to 
all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circum-
stances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or 
some other wrong.”51  Given the broad, sweeping language of the Court’s 
holding, commentators and courts have understandably erred in their belief 
that the PLRA now applies to all prisoner suits, regardless of their claims.52  
The error stems from focusing on the latter portion of the holding 
(“whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong”) and conclud-
ing that the Court intended to encompass every conceivable claim made by 
a prisoner.  Such a reading, however, overstates the Court’s holding and 
leads to anomalous results.53 
The proper interpretation of the Porter holding realizes that the latter 
clause is limited by the former.  In other words, the holding covers all pos-
sible claims made by a prisoner, but only to the extent that the claim is 
about prison life.  Thus, one can imagine numerous claims brought by 
prisoners that are not about prison life and therefore are not subject to the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.54  A prisoner’s claim for access to evi-
dence in the procurement phase is one such claim. 
Moreover, a claim by a prisoner to obtain access to evidence in order 
to conduct DNA testing is not one about “prison life” in the ordinary sense 
of that term.  Prisoners in the procurement phase are neither complaining 
about the conditions of their confinement nor seeking redress for alleged 
wrongdoing by corrections officers; rather, they are merely attempting to 
  
 49. Id. at 520. 
 50. Id. at 532. 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. John Collins, Student Author,  The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Excessive Force as a Prison 
Condition, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 395, 396 (“The Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit, 
held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits regardless of their claim.”).  
See also Fatir v. Dowdy, 2002 WL 2018824 at *12 (D. Del., Sept. 4, 2002) (memorandum and order). 
 53. See Fatir, 2002 WL 2018824 at **11-12 (finding that, since the Supreme Court did not specifi-
cally exclude constitutional claims from those subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, plain-
tiff’s First Amendment constitutional claims must be exhausted even though they “do not appear to 
assert claims for prison conditions”). 
 54. For example, a person may have a § 1983 cause of action against a police officer for an illegal 
search and seizure that occurred before his incarceration.  Because of the statute of limitations, the 
claim would not have to be brought for a number of years.  In the meantime, before the claim is filed, 
the person is arrested and imprisoned for an unrelated crime.  Once in prison, the person may bring the 
§ 1983 action against the officer.  See Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 
1560, p. 446-47.  This claim would not be about prison life and thus not subjected to the PLRA’s ex-
haustion requirement.  Under an interpretation that the Porter holding applies to all prisoner suits, 
however, the person would be precluded from filing his claim directly in federal court without first 
exhausting administrative remedies.  
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compel state prosecutors and sheriffs to respect their due process right to 
obtain exculpatory evidence.55  It follows that such claims are not ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Porter and thus are not subject 
to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 
2. The Abstention Doctrines are Generally Inapplicable 
The Supreme Court has determined that, in some instances, federal dis-
trict courts must abstain from hearing cases that are otherwise justiciable,56 
especially where abstention leads to “proper constitutional adjudication, 
regard for federal-state relations, or wise judicial administration.”57  An 
argument thus could be made that federal courts should abstain from hear-
ing prisoners’ claims in the procurement phase where the convicting state 
has enacted post-conviction DNA testing legislation because “wise judicial 
administration” favors state-court adjudication of state prisoners’ post-
conviction claims.  This argument is further supported by the well-settled 
doctrine that a federal court has authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
when “employ[ing] its historic powers as a court of equity.”58  Because 
prisoners in the procurement phase are seeking an equitable remedy in the 
form of injunctive relief, the argument continues, federal courts should use 
their authority to abstain from hearing their claims. 
Despite the intrinsic appeal of this argument, a general rule of federal 
court abstention from hearing claims in the procurement phase would be 
inappropriate for several reasons.  First, it is clear that federal courts have 
the authority to interpret state law.59  Second, federal courts regularly in-
terpret state law when exercising supplemental jurisdiction and thus are 
competent tribunals to adjudicate state prisoners’ § 1983 claims.  Finally, 
the Court has been reluctant to extend the abstention doctrines beyond sev-
eral well-established circumstances,60 none of which generally are applica-
ble in the procurement phase. 61   
  
 55. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 487 (1989) (“Defendant has a constitutional right to obtain . . . 
exculpatory evidence.”); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  While the right to excul-
patory evidence generally is relevant before trial, it is equally applicable after conviction where testing 
may prove the defendant’s innocence.  See Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (1990) (“[W]here 
evidence has been preserved which has a high exculpatory potential, that evidence should be discover-
able after conviction.”). 
 56. Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 685. 
 57. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (quoting Colo. River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. U. S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 717 (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 59. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 60. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); R.R. Commn. of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 
(1941); La. Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Colo. River Water Conservation 
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3. Due Process & the Procurement Phase  
In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland,62 the Supreme Court held 
that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process 
where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment.63  Evidence is 
material under the Brady rule if “its suppression undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial.”64  Although Brady was concerned with pre-trial 
rights of an accused, the Court has long since recognized that prisoners 
also are entitled to due process protections.65   
Brady logically extends from the accused to the imprisoned because 
suppressed DNA evidence necessarily undermines confidence in the out-
come of a trial.66  The potentially exculpatory effect of DNA testing67 casts 
doubt on the jury’s finding in any trial where such evidence was available 
but not admitted.68  Indeed, where witnesses’ memories fail, testimony is 
weighed subjectively by judges and juries, and sympathies are extended to 
victims, DNA may be the only objective and inherently neutral evidence 
that can affirmatively demonstrate a defendant’s innocence.  Where such 
evidence exists, it shocks the conscience to deny inmates access to it.69 
Critics argue that defendants should not be constitutionally entitled to 
conduct post-conviction DNA testing on evidence because the unavailabil-
ity of DNA testing at the time of trial does not mean that their trial was 
  
Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).   
 61. Younger abstention applies where the federal court may interfere with ongoing state proceed-
ings.  Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 716.  Pullman abstention is permitted when state law is unclear and a 
state court’s clarification may make a federal court’s constitutional ruling unnecessary.  Id. at 687.  
Thibodaux abstention is relevant in a diversity case if “there is uncertain state law and an important 
state interest that is ‘intimately involved’ with the government’s ‘sovereign prerogative.’”  Id. at 701.   
Colorado River abstention is relevant in limited circumstances where there is there is duplicative litiga-
tion in state and federal courts.  Id. at 757-78.  Brillhart abstention applies where a district court de-
clines to hear a claim seeking declaratory judgment.  Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 715 
(5th ed., West 1994).  Burford abstention applies where the federal court defers to complex state ad-
ministrative procedures.  Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 702.   
 62. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 63. Id. at 87. 
 64. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). 
 65. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); see also Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. 
Attorney’s Off., 177 F.Supp.2d 366, 369 (2001); Dabbs 570 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68. 
 66. Godschalk, 177 F.Supp.2d at 370; Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (“[W]here evidence has been 
preserved which has high exculpatory potential, that evidence should be discoverable after convic-
tion.”). 
 67. See Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(B);  Cf. Natl. Commn. on the Future of DNA Evi-
dence, Natl. Inst. of Just., U.S. Dept. of Just., Postconviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for 
Handling Requests (1999) [hereinafter NIJ Report]; Schaffter, supra n. 37, at 699-702. 
 68. Godschalk, 177 F.Supp.2d at 370 (granting plaintiff’s request for DNA testing, even though he 
had confessed to the crime, because, given the “well-known powerful exculpatory effect of DNA 
testing,” confidence in the jury’s finding of guilt would be undermined). 
 69. Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(K). 
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unfair.70  While it may be technically true that the wrongly convicted re-
ceived a constitutionally “fair” trial, this argument callously disregards the 
truth that conceptions of fairness and justice evolve with societal advance-
ments. Relying on historical notions of fairness to preclude post-conviction 
DNA testing damages the credibility of our justice system and validates the 
constitutionally unacceptable act of punishing innocent persons. 
Skeptics also contend that recognition of a post-conviction constitu-
tional right to obtain DNA evidence in order to conduct testing will flood 
the courts with claims and overburden the judiciary.  Of course, this is 
mere speculation, because it is uncertain how much genetic evidence has 
been preserved from cases decided decades ago; it is even less certain how 
many prisoners will seek such evidence even if they can.  Moreover, Con-
gress has proposed that prisoners who file frivolous claims should be sub-
ject to further prosecution.71  Thus, a sudden influx of claims brought into 
district courts, even if it occurred, merely will incentivize Congress to en-
act its currently pending legislation in order to place procedural restrictions 
on procurement phase claims.72 
B. The Exoneration Phase 
Once a prisoner is successful in the procurement phase and obtains ex-
culpatory DNA testing results, he enters the exoneration phase, in which he 
seeks release from prison based on the newly-obtained DNA evidence.  In 
this phase, the prisoner, in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,73 claims 
that he is “actually innocent” of the charges and should be released from 
prison.  The concerns of protecting finality and preserving federalism that 
lead the Supreme Court to reject the petitioner’s claim for exoneration in 
Herrera are no longer applicable and should not prevent courts from free-
ing prisoners with exculpatory DNA evidence. 
  
 70. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 379. 
 71. See Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003 § 3600(f), 2003 S. 1700, 108th 
Cong. (Oct. 1, 2003). 
 72. See Part IV infra for a discussion of the restrictions imposed by pending Congressional legisla-
tion.  For a detailed argument of why Supreme Court jurisprudence compels the recognition of a due 
process right to post-conviction genetic testing, see Harvey, 285 F.3d at 312-20 (Luttig, J., respecting 
the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 73. A habeas petition is the proper remedy for state prisoners seeking a federal-court determination 
that their confinement is unconstitutional.  Wright, supra n. 61, at 352.  The writ “is a bulwark against 
convictions that violate ‘fundamental fairness,’” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982), and permits 
a federal court to order the release of a state prisoner held in violation of the constitution.  Wright, 
supra n. 61, at 352. 
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1. Herrera v. Collins 
While nearly everyone agrees that an actually innocent prisoner should 
be released from confinement, some remain unconvinced that DNA testing 
can prove such innocence conclusively.  Skeptics argue that DNA, like 
fingerprints, is “negative evidence” - while its presence can establish that 
someone was at a crime scene, its absence does not necessarily mean that 
someone was not there.74  Thus, a prisoner in the exoneration phase should 
retain the burden of demonstrating how the results of the DNA testing con-
clusively establish his innocence.  It is clear from the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Heck and Preiser that such a result cannot be accomplished 
through a § 1983 action, but there is some doubt as to what does constitute 
the proper federal remedy.  
In Herrera v. Collins,75 the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to 
exonerate prisoners, based on claims of actual innocence, solely because of 
newly discovered evidence.  The petitioner in that case, Leonel Herrera, 
was convicted of capital murder.76 In an attempt to avoid his death sen-
tence, he produced various affidavits that claimed he had not committed 
the crime.77 The Court suggested that the continued incarceration of some-
one who could make a “truly persuasive” showing of actual innocence is 
unconstitutional,78 but without explaining what evidence would suffice to 
meet this standard, the Court found that Herrera’s claim fell “far short” of 
it79 and suggested that he seek executive clemency instead.80  Four Justices 
criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on clemency to vindicate the 
rights of actually innocent prisoners and proposed various standards that, if 
met, would allow a prisoner claiming actual innocence access to a judicial 
proceeding.81  Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected these standards and argued 
that there is no guarantee, if a prisoner’s claim of actual innocence was 
  
 74. Interview by Ofra Bikel with Judge Sharon Keller, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (transcript 
at Frontline, The Case for Innocence, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/ 
keller.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004)); but see Christian, supra n. 37, at 1227 (“[T]he accuracy of 
DNA testing demands that DNA evidence be given greater weight than fingerprint evidence.”). 
 75. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 76. Id. at 393. 
 77. Id. at 396-97. 
 78. Id. at 417. 
 79. Id. at 418-19. 
 80. See id. at 411. 
 81. Justice White would permit federal courts to hear claims of actual innocence, even after tradi-
tional remedies were exhausted, if the prisoner could show that “based on proffered newly discovered 
evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, ‘no rational trier of fact could [find] 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).  Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter would also 
permit federal courts to consider claims of actual innocence where the petitioner demonstrates that he 
“probably is innocent.” Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
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considered in a judicial hearing, that the determination of guilt or inno-
cence would be any more accurate than at trial because the “passage of 
time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications.”82  More-
over, the Court questioned the credibility of Herrera’s affidavits because he 
did not explain why he waited until the “11th hour” to produce them, they 
contained inconsistencies, and, save for one, they all consisted of hear-
say.83 
Currently, a court’s analysis in the exoneration phase is limited by the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Herrera. Arguably, the sole remedy available 
is executive clemency;84  however, Herrera was decided in 1993, before 
DNA testing became prevalent in courts.85 Additionally, the Court’s rea-
sons for rejecting Herrera’s claim of actual innocence - the passage of time 
and the questionable nature of affidavits - are not of concern in the exon-
eration phase, where the prisoner appears before the court with DNA test-
ing results that might demonstrate conclusively that he was not the perpe-
trator.86  DNA results, unlike affidavits and witness testimony fashioned 
years after the trial, are not subject to bias87 and thus should alleviate the 
Court’s concerns regarding the integrity of the petitioner’s claim.88 
The Herrera court’s reliance on executive clemency to handle claims 
of actual innocence is misplaced for prisoners in the exoneration phase.  
The Court explained that clemency is the “historic remedy for preventing 
miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted[,]”89 and 
provides the “‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice system.”90  While clemency 
may be well-suited to handle individual claims of innocence based on 
questionable nonscientific evidence proffered subsequent to the exhaustion 
  
 82. Id. at 403-04 (citing McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) to argue that “erosion of mem-
ory and dispersion of witnesses” would lessen the chances of a reliable trial for prisoners claiming 
actual innocence). 
 83. Id. at 417-18. 
 84. But see NIJ Report, supra n. 67, at 13 (suggesting that DNA evidence may suffice to make a 
“truly persuasive” showing of actual innocence and thus make habeas petitions viable for prisoners). 
 85. Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 101(a)(3); H.R. 912, 107th Cong. at § 101(a)(3); see also Boemer, 
supra n. 37, at 1976 (noting that post-conviction DNA testing did not “move[ ] to the forefront” until 
1996); Schaffter, supra n. 37, at 699-702 (explaining the history of DNA evidence and noting that it 
“was not admitted in all United States jurisdictions until 1998.”). 
 86. See Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(B); Christian, supra n. 37, at 1195; NIJ Report, supra 
n. 67, at 19. 
 87. This statement assumes that DNA analysts’ personal biases are avoided by, for example, con-
ducting a double-blind analysis of the evidence.   
 88. See Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(D) (“Uniquely, DNA evidence showing innocence, 
produced decades after a conviction, provides a more reliable basis for establishing a correct verdict 
than any evidence proffered at the original trial.”). 
 89. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-12. 
 90. Id. at 415. 
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of judicial remedies,91 it never was intended to provide widespread relief to 
an entire class of persons who can demonstrate their innocence conclu-
sively.  Prisoners in the exoneration phase should not be forced to seek 
executive clemency, an arduous process that generally contains its own 
procedural requirements,92 because the judiciary, after considering the peti-
tioner’s record as a whole, is better equipped to evaluate the exculpatory 
nature of the evidence.93 
2. Should Finality  and Federalism Prevent Exoneration? 
Even if Herrera is not controlling, skeptics may argue, the possibility 
of exonerating prisoners will disrupt the interests of finality and federal-
state comity that traditionally have limited the scope of habeas review.94   
Finality is a problem that “raises acute tensions in our society.”95  It is 
important because it gives legitimacy to convictions96 and allows prisoners 
to begin rehabilitating once it becomes apparent that their convictions will 
not be overturned.97 Without it, “criminal law is deprived of much of its 
deterrent effect.”98  Skeptics of post-conviction DNA testing argue the 
dangers of a slippery-slope effect - if prisoners can obtain testing whenever 
a there is a technological advancement, there will never be any finality to 
convictions.99  Whatever the relative importance of protecting finality, it 
cannot be more necessary to the criminal justice system than the exonera-
tion of innocent prisoners.100  Indeed, the highly exculpatory nature of 
  
 91. But see Alyson Dinsmore, Student Author, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure 
Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1825 (opining that clemency is not an effective substitute for 
judicial consideration of claims of actual innocence). 
 92. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415-18 (describing Texas clemency procedures). 
 93. See NIJ Report, supra n. 67, at xvi (recommending that the judiciary, not the governor, consider 
the relevance of favorable post-conviction DNA testing). 
 94. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989); Engle, 456 U.S. at 126; see also Herrera, 506 U.S. at 
426 (“At some point in time, the State’s interest in finality must outweigh the prisoner’s interest in yet 
another round of litigation.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Harvey, 285 F.3d at 299 (“It is important 
however that claims of innocence should be entertained, where possible, in the first instance by the 
court, or at least by the court system, that initially heard the case.”). 
 95. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 441 (1963). 
 96. Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involv-
ing Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 389, 409 (2002). 
 97. Bator, supra n. 95, at 452. 
 98. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309. 
 99. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 376 (“[W]e believe that finality cannot be sacrificed to every change in 
technology.”); but see Harvey, 285 F.3d at 321 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 100. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398 (“[T]he central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to 
convict the guilty and free the innocent.”); Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (“[T]o deny petitioner the 
opportunity to prove his innocence with such evidence simply to ensure the finality of convictions is 
untenable.”). 
File: ruga[1].final(macro)moyermaier Created on: 3/10/2004 2:27 PM Last Printed: 4/2/2004 4:28 PM 
2004 DNA TESTING:  A BIFURCATED APPROACH 51 
DNA testing satisfies even the most conservative approaches to limit the 
number of collateral attacks on criminal convictions.101 
Skeptics may also argue that prisoners who hold favorable DNA test-
ing results should nevertheless be subjected to the exhaustion requirements 
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)102 before 
having their claims heard in federal court.103  Among the various restric-
tions AEDPA places on habeas petitions,104 § 2244(b)(2) requires dismissal 
of a second or successive habeas petition if the claim had not been pre-
sented previously unless the prisoner can demonstrate that: (1) the factual 
predicate of the claim could not have been discovered previously through 
reasonable diligence, and (2) the claim, if proven, would be sufficient to 
establish by “clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional 
error,” no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty.105  More-
over, AEDPA requires that a prisoner obtain an order from the appropriate 
court of appeals to direct a district court to entertain the claim.106 
AEDPA should not stand in the way of the exoneration of innocent 
prisoners.  AEDPA was enacted to further the interests of finality, comity, 
and federalism;107 however, these concerns are not offended where a pris-
oner possesses exculpatory DNA testing results and seeks immediate re-
lease from prison.  Moreover, legislation currently pending in Congress 
expresses an apparent interest in excluding claims based on post-
conviction DNA testing from AEDPA’s requirements.108  While provisions 
  
 101. See generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).  Judge Friendly sought to limit the number of habeas petitions 
filed by prisoners by requiring such claims to be supplemented with “a colorable claim of innocence.”  
Id. at 142.  One acceptable manner for the prisoner to achieve this is by showing “a fair probability 
that, in light of all the evidence, including . . . evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded 
or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reason-
able doubt of his guilt.”  Id. at 160. 
 102. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 103. The Ninth Circuit recently confronted this very issue in Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (2003), 
and concluded that AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement applies to claims of actual innocence based on 
newly discovered evidence.  The court explained that the limitations period on these claims “begins to 
run when the prisoner could have discovered the new evidence through the exercise of due diligence.”  
Id. at 1083.  Under AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement, however, the prisoner’s federal habeas claim 
cannot be filed until state court remedies have been exhausted.  Id.  Accordingly, the federal limitations 
period is tolled while the state claim is pending.  Id. 
 104. See Howard P. Fink, et al., Federal Courts In The 21st Century, 1022 (2d ed., LexisNexis 2002). 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000) (emphasis added).  A prisoner may also escape dismissal if 
he can demonstrate that his claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases 
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b)(2)(A) (2000).   
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2000). 
 107. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). 
 108. See Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(h)(3) (explaining that a motion for post-conviction DNA 
testing shall not be considered a habeas petition for purposes of considering whether the motion should 
be barred by AEDPA). 
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of pending legislation are by no means binding on federal courts, they do 
provide guidance in handling novel issues that Congress has considered.  
Current legislative efforts, coupled with the realization that no interest is 
served by precluding the exoneration of an innocent prisoner, should pro-
vide federal courts with a reasonable basis for departure from AEDPA’s 
restraints. 
Even if AEDPA’s strict requirements are not imposed on prisoners in 
the exoneration phase, exhaustion of state remedies should not be disre-
garded completely.  The Supreme Court has touted on numerous occasions 
the importance of exhaustion in respecting federalism.109  Indeed, long 
before the passage of AEDPA, the Court declared that, in the interest of 
comity, federal courts should not entertain habeas petitions until the state 
courts have had an opportunity to resolve the matter.110  This idea, that 
federal courts should avoid interfering with the legitimate activities of the 
states, has existed since the early days of America.111  It “occupies a highly 
important place in our Nation's history and its future.”112 
Typically, exhaustion is required only where the state remedy is ade-
quate and available.113  For prisoners in the exoneration phase, state relief 
may or may not be available, depending on the particular state’s post-
conviction legislation.114  Thus, if the state does not have a post-conviction 
DNA testing statute, or if the prisoner would be procedurally barred from 
asserting a right under an applicable state statute, the prisoner should be 
able to file his habeas petition in federal court without first seeking state 
redress, since any such attempt would be futile.  On the other hand, if the 
state has an adequate115 post-conviction DNA statute or procedure pursuant 
to which the prisoner is able to bring a claim, then it is reasonable to re-
quire that such remedies be exhausted before suit is filed in federal 
court.116   
  
 109. See e.g. Younger, 401 U.S. at 37 (1971).  In Younger, the Court explained that the notion of 
“Our Federalism” represents the idea that “the National Government will fare best if the States and 
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”).  Id. at 44. 
 110. Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491 (“The rule of exhaustion 
in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal-state comity.”); Darr v. Burford, 
339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (“[I]t would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal 
district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a 
constitutional violation.”);  Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 800-01. 
 111. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). 
 114. See supra Part III & n. 36. 
 115. There is some debate as to what remedy is “adequate” where a prisoner holds favorable DNA 
test results; however, anything less than a right to a new trial should not be considered adequate. 
 116. Indeed, pending federal legislation requires state prisoners to exhaust available state remedies 
before seeking redress in federal court.  Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II). 
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IV. THE ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY ACT:  A 
STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
The Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003 (the 
“Act”),117 which currently is pending in both branches of Congress, pro-
vides certain post-conviction DNA testing rights to prisoners,118 but falls 
short of recognizing prisoners’ due process rights to the evidence.   
A. Claims Made in the Procurement Phase 
Pursuant to the Act, prisoners who are incarcerated for a state offense 
may make a motion for post-conviction DNA in federal court only if: (1) 
there is no adequate state remedy; or (2) the prisoner can demonstrate that 
he has exhausted available state remedies.119  Recall that § 1983, the tradi-
tional vehicle for redress in federal court by state prisoners, does not have 
an exhaustion requirement.120  It thus appears that the Act intends to mod-
ify § 1983 by requiring exhaustion in the post-conviction DNA testing 
context; however, the Act never specifically states this intent.  Indeed, in 
an apparent attempt to avoid the very confusion that it creates, the Act 
makes clear that it shall not “affect the circumstances under which a person 
may obtain DNA testing or post-conviction relief under any other law.”121 
This legislation would allow a prisoner to bring a civil action to assert 
his right to post-conviction DNA testing, but it is unclear whether such a 
suit could be brought under § 1983.  The Supreme Court has explained that 
Congress may preclude the availability of § 1983 suits to vindicate federal 
rights by including a “sufficiently comprehensive” remedial scheme in an 
Act;122  the scheme’s existence evidences Congress’ intent to prohibit oth-
erwise cognizable §1983 claims.123 
As written currently, it is unclear whether Congress intends for the 
Act’s remedial scheme to foreclose § 1983 actions to prisoners who are 
denied post-conviction DNA testing.  The Act simultaneously adds an ex-
haustion requirement to claims made in the procurement phase and states 
  
 117. For a discussion of Congress’ ability to enact the Advancing Justice through DNA Technology 
Act, see Larry Yackle, Congressional Power to Require DNA Testing, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1173 (2001). 
 118. The Act also provides relief for federal prisoners, but analysis of those provisions is outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
 119. Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 120. See Part IIIA. 
 121. Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(h)(1). 
 122. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Natl. Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). 
 123. Id. at 21.  Justice Stevens, writing separately, suggests that Congressional intent should not be 
assumed by the mere existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme; rather, the burden should be on 
the defendant to identify express language demonstrating Congress’ intent to foreclose § 1983 actions.  
Id. at 28 & n. 11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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that other laws shall remain unaffected.  Unless revised, this ambiguity will 
lead to confusion and further delays in the exoneration of innocent prison-
ers. 
B. Claims Made in the Exoneration Phase 
Under the Act, a prisoner who receives exculpatory DNA testing re-
sults may file a motion for a new trial or resentencing.  This motion shall 
be granted if the court finds that “the DNA test results, when considered 
with all other evidence in the case (regardless of whether such evidence 
was introduced at trial), establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
new trial would result in an acquittal . . . .”124  The Act precludes an end-
run around its requirements by stating that “[n]othing in [the Act] shall 
provide a basis for relief in any [f]ederal habeas corpus proceeding.”125 
The consequence of the Act is that prisoners in the exoneration phase 
who possess exculpatory DNA test results may receive a new trial if the 
judge concludes after considering all of the evidence - even evidence that 
was not introduced at trial - that an acquittal is likely.  This remedy is a far 
cry from the exoneration and release from confinement currently available 
to prisoners through a successful writ of habeas corpus or executive clem-
ency.  Thus, while the Act is a step in the right direction, in many ways it 
lessens innocent prisoners’ available remedies.126 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current split among the circuits as to what rights prisoners have to 
post-conviction DNA testing must be resolved.  Congress ultimately will 
determine the proper approach to handling such claims; however, given the 
current political climate, legislation may take years to enact.  In the mean-
time, the Supreme Court should recognize that DNA testing can rectify the 
inherent errors of our fallible justice system.127  In so doing, it is imperative 
that a bifurcated approach be employed whereby a due process right to 
DNA testing is recognized in the procurement phase and judicial review of 
favorable testing results is mandated in the exoneration phase.   
  
 124. S. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(g)(2). 
 125. Id. at § 3600(h)(2). 
 126. There is no need to elaborate further on the proper judicial interpretation of this statute because 
it is still pending and subject to revision. 
 127. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415 (“It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human 
beings who administer it, is fallible.”). 
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Moreover, pre-existing procedural restrictions, such as the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act, which are meant to keep frivolous claims out of court, should not be 
permitted to preclude meritorious claims of innocence based on DNA test-
ing.  Only when these rights are bestowed upon prisoners and the inno-
cently incarcerated are allowed to regain their freedom can the criminal 
justice system be considered just. 
 
